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29 de abr. de 2024 · Roger B. Myerson (born March 29, 1951, Boston, Mass., U.S.) is an American economist who shared, with Leonid Hurwicz and Eric S. Maskin, the 2007 Nobel Prize for Economics for his work on mechanism design theory. Myerson earned both bachelor’s and master’s degrees in applied mathematics from Harvard University in 1973.
6 de may. de 2024 · Roger B Myerson and Mark A Satterthwaite. 1983. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of economic theory, Vol. 29, 2 (1983), 265--281. Google Scholar Cross Ref; Katerina Sherstyuk, Krit Phankitnirundorn, and Michael J Roberts. 2020. Randomized double auctions: gains from trade, trader roles, and price discovery.
6 de may. de 2024 · Roger B. Myerson. 1997. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press. Google Scholar; NASA Technosignatures Workshop Participants. 2019. NASA and the Search for Technosignatures: A Report from the NASA Technosignatures Workshop. arxiv: 1812.08681 [astroph.IM] Google Scholar; Steven Pinker. 2012.
6 de may. de 2024 · This paper investigates some connections between individual values, such as the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, and coalition values, such as blockability value, viability value and profitability value, for games in characteristic function form.
30 de abr. de 2024 · This seventh edition adds six Nobelists to its pages: Roger B. Myerson (co-recipient in 2007) describes his evolution as a game theorist and his application of game theory to issues that ranged from electoral systems to perverse incentives; Thomas J. Sargent (co-recipient in 2011), recounts the development of the rational ...
29 de abr. de 2024 · Eric S. Maskin is an American economist who, with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger B. Myerson, received a share of the 2007 Nobel Prize for Economics for his work on mechanism design theory, a specialized form of game theory that attempts to maximize gains for all parties within markets.
11 de may. de 2024 · Because voters can oust corrupt politicians from office, electoral rules that enhance political accountability should constrain the behavior of corrupt politicians. 3 While there are convincing theoretical arguments for why political institutions affect corruption (see, for example, Roger B. Myerson 1993; Torsten Persson, Gerard ...
